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pendently of the Constitution of the United States, belonging to
that original legislative power which is vested in the people,
which they never have delegated to the General Government,
and which they have in the most general and unlimited mannei
committed to the several state legislatures.
J. H. T.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

S ipreme Court 9f Penne!]lvania.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. v. BOOKS.
In an action against a Tailroad company for injury caused by an accident, evidence that the conductor was intemperate or otherwise incompetent is admissible to
raise a presumption of negligence.
Admissions or declarations of the employees of the company, made subsequently
to the accident, are not competent evidence. Such declarations are only competent
as part of the res gestx.
The declarations of an officer of the company stand upon the same footing.
In an action for damages by a person injured by negligence, evidence of the
number of plaintiff's family or of his habits and industry is not admissible unless
special damage is averred.
It is no justification for the employment of an incompetent'servant that competent ones were difficult to obtain.
Where a person injured by a railroad accident had accepted a ticket or pass*
describing him as "route agent, an employee of the Railroad Co.," this pass is
competent evidence for the company, but it does not estop the plaintiff from showing that he was not, in fact, an employee of the company.
In an action for injury by negligence the damages should be compensation .for
the actual injury, and it is error to leave the measure and amount of damages, as
well as the rules by which they are to be estimated, entirely to the jury.

WRIT of error to Common Pleas of Snyder countyq.
The plaintiff was a United States mail agent, employed by the
Post-Office Department to take charge of mails on the cars-of the
defendant company

While on the train an accident occurred by which he was
injured, whereupon he brought an action upon the case for
damages.
Plaintiff recovered a verdict, and defendant took this writ of
error upon points which sufficiently appear in the opinion of the
court.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-This was an action by the plaintiff below
against the defendants, the plaintiffs in error, to recover damages
for injuries alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of
their servants. Nine errors have been assigned, which it is our
duty to consider.
, The 1st is that the court erred in admitting testimony, touching
the habits and competency of the conductor of a coal train, in the
employ of the company, which had run into the passenger train
and caused the injury. This assignment of error was not pressed,
and properly. If by direct evidence it appeared that the conductor was a man of intemperate habits, it would cast upon the
defendants the burthen -of proving that he was not intoxicated at
the time and had used proper care. It is certainly incumbent
upon railroad companies to employ none but sober men on their
roads. Where a habit of intoxication in a conductor is shown,
it raises, in-the case of an accident, a presumption of negligence,
which stands until it is rebutted.
The 2d assignment of error is, that the learned. judge erred in
admitting evidence of statenients of the flagman made subsequent
to the accident. - The plaintiff proposed to ask'a witness if the
flagman showed him how far he had gone back to flag the fast line.
This was admitted, and an exception sealed. The rule is well
settled, that what an agent says, while acting within the scope..of
his authority, is admissible against his principal, as part of the
res gestce., but not 'statements or representations made by him at
any other time: Shelhamer v. Thomas, 7 S. &-R. 106; Levering
v. Rittenhouse, 4 Whart. 130; Jordan v. Stewart, 11 Harris
244. The admissions of an agent, not made at the time of the
transaction, but subsequently, are not evidence Thus, the letters
of an agent to his principal, containing a narration of the trans.
action, in which he.had been employed, are not admissible against
the principal: Hugh v. Doyle, 4 Rawle 291 ; Olark v. Bake&,'2
Whart. 340. Naked declarations, Which are not part of .any i-es
gestce, are mere hearsay, like words spoken by a stranger: Patton
v. Minesinger, 1 Casey 893. The flagman himself was a compe
tent witness, but his statement of what he had done was clearly
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incompetent. There was error, therefore, in the admission of this
evidence.
The 3d error assigned is in admitting evidence of statements
made by the vice-president of the company. The plaintiff offered
to ask a witness what Mr. Lombaert said about the railroad company receiving pay for carrying the mails. This was objected
to, but the objection was overruled, and an exception taken,
Declarations made by. the officers of a corporation'rest upon the
same principles as apply to other agents. In a case where the
admissions of the trustees of a religious corporation were offered
in evidence, C. J. TILGHMAN said: "An agent is authorized to.
act; -therefore, his acts, explained by his declarations during the
time of action, are obligatory on' his principal, but he has no
authority to make 'confessions after he has acted, and, therefore,
his principal is not bound by such confessions: Magill v. Kauffman, 4 S. & R. 321; Spalding v. The Bank of Susqehanna
County, 9 Barr 28. So it has been ruled that in an action by a
bank, evidence .of the parol declarations of the officers of the
bank is. not admissible for, the defendant, without proof of the
particular officer's being authorized by the board of directors to
speak for them, even though it should appear that the board kept
no regular minutes of tlieir transactions: Stewart v. The .fruntingdon Bank, 11 S. & R. 267. In like manner declarations
made by a person, who had been president of a bank, respecting
payments made on a note, are not evidence against the.bank:
Sterling v. The Marietta and iS'usquehanna Trading Co., 11 S.
& 'R. 179; Bank of Northern Liberties v. Davis, '6 W. & S.
285. The decision in the case of The ffarriiburgBank v. Tyler,
3 W. & S. 373, does not conflict with these 'authorities-for the
declaration of the cashier was received in that case as evidence
that the bank had knowledge of a- trust, and it was in the per.
formance of those functions, which peculiarly belong to that
officer in the current transactions of its business: Hfazleton Coal
Co. v. Megargel, 4 Barr 329. This assignment of error is, there.
fore, sustained.
The 4th error assigned is, that the learned judge erred in admitting evidence of the number of plaintiff's family, his habits,
industry, and economy, as affecting the question of damages. In
Laing v. Colder, 8 Barr 479, it was ruled, in a case of injury to
the person, that damages sustained' by the plaintiff, from the'cir-
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cumstance of his being the head of a family dependent upon him,
have no necessary connection with the injury. Such damages
may or -may not follow a temporary bodily disability. Damages.
of this nature are, therefore, not direct or necessary, but special
as being possible only, and must be specially averred to let in
evidence of them. It is difficult also to see what bearing the
plaintiff's habits, industry, and economy could legitimately have
on the damages. They might. be important in a proceeding under
the Act of April 26th 1855 (Pamph. L. 309),' but in'an action
by the injured" party himself they were irrelevant, and tended
only to excite feelings of commiseration and sympathy in the
breasts of the jurors, and to inflame unjustly the damagesresults which in all actions of this character ought carefully to
be avoided.
The 5th error is in excluding testimony offered by the defe-ndants below touching the efforts made by them to secure competent
train bands. We think the court was right in excluding thiq
testimony. It was no justification or excuse to the company in
employing an intemperate or incompetent man in a business
involving such peril to life and limb, that hands were scarce. For
a sufficiently high rate of compensation sober and competent men
are always to be had. Such evidence, if- admitted, would necessarily lead to collateral issues far wide of that on trial. We
think there was no error in this ruling.
The 6tl error assigned is in excluding from evidence 'the
employee's pass, upon which the plaintiff was riding. The ticket
produced was in these terms: "1Employee's monthly pass. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. Pass S. Books, Route Agent, an employee
of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company." The evidence offered
was of course to show that the plaintiff accepted and used this
ticket. It certainly was an adm'iission by him that he bore to the
plaintiffs in error the relation of an employee or servant. It was
not indeed conclusive-not an estoppel-if explained so as to show
that'he was really not in the employ of the company, but, as was
alleged, received and.used the ticket as a route agent in the service
of the post-office department of the government of the United Statts
under a contract between that department and the company for
carrying the mails.. Standing alone, uncontradicted and unex.
I Action
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plained, the pass would have been sufficient to show that the relation
existed between the company and the plaintiff stated on its face,
and it was admissible no matter what evidence to the contrary had
been previously given. The plaintiffs in error had a right to have
the whole evidence go to the jury, as it would then have been a
question for them, and could not have been shut out from their
consideration, as it was by the judge in his answer to their 7tb
point. This assignment of error is therefore.sustained.
The'7th error assigned is, that the learned judge erred in
his instructions to the jury on the subject of damages, and in his
answers on the same subject to the ninth and tenth points presented by the defendants below. After laying down a measure,
which is not objected to here, and on which, therefore, we give no
opinion, he added, "1These we think would be fair rules to ascertain the measure of .damages the plaintiff would be entitled to in
this case; but if you can find any better ones than those suggested
you are at liberty to adopt them, as the measure and amount of
damages are entirely for you to ascertain, under all the evidence
and circumstances in the case." The effect of this language was
to leave the measure of damages entirely in the discretion of the
jury. The general rule in actions on the case. for negligence is
that the party aggrieved is entitled to recover only to the extent
of his actual injury. In the case of a suit" by the party injured
himself, it may no doubt include a reasonable compensation for
paid and suffering, as well as the expense of medical attendance
and the loss of time consequent upon confinement. BU't in these
cases, as well as in those brought under the. Act of April 26th
1855, unless the injury has been wantonly inflicted, when exemplary damages njay be given, the jury muqt be confined to damages strictly compensatory. "Injuries to the person consist in
the pain suffered, bodily or mental, and in the expenses and loss
of property they occasion. In estimating damages, the jury may
consider not only the direct expenses incurred by the plaintiff,
but the loss of his time, the bodily suffering endured and any incurable hurt inflicted." Per BELL, J., in Laing v. Colder, 8 Barr
481. There was error therefore in this instruction.
The objection to the answer to the 9th point has not been pressed,
and very properly. We see no error in it. The 10th point was "that
if the court should be of opinion that plaintiff may recover, then the
measure of damages would be the pecuniary loss he has sustained
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in consequence of the injuries received." The answer was: "This
is not the entire measure of damages you can give the plaintiff, if
you believe this occurred from the gross negligence of the defendants' agents." The court might with more accuracy and propriety
have simply negatived the point, for it was not true, whether the
negligence of the defendants' agents was gross or otherwise.
There is, therefore, no error in this answer of which the plaintiffs
in error have any right to complain.
As to the 8th assignment of error, we think the learned
judge was clearly right in his answers to the third, fourth, and
fifth points presented by the defendants below. Every one riding
in a railroad car is presumed primdfacie to be there lawfully as
a passenger, having paid or being liable when called on to pay his
fare, and the onus is upon the carrier to prbve affirmatively that
he was a trespasser. So as to the 9th error assigned, the employee's pass having been excluded, though we think improperly,
there was no eVidence that the plaintiff was an employee of the
company.
Judgment reversed, and venirefacias de novo awarded.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
HAYCOCK, ADMR. OF SHIVE, v. GREUP.

"

When specimens of handwriting, admitted or proved to be genuine, are offered
to prove by comparison the genuineness of the writing in issue, the comparison can
only be made by the jury.
Such evidexice is competent only as corroborative of other proof; it is not admis.
sible as independent proof.
On an issue to determine the genuineness of a signature of A., specimens of
B.'s writing in which the name of A. occurs are not competent independent evidence to prove by comparison that the signature of A. was wVritten by B. Nor is
the opinion of a witness that the signature was not written by A. any foundation
for such proof that it was written by B.
Whether such testimony would be competent even in corroboration of other
testimony that B. had written the signature in issue, doubted'by STRONG, J..
A sealed special verdict so expressed as to be ambiguous may be reformed aid
moulded by the court in presence of the jury, without sending the jury out to

reconsider it.

of error to the Common Pleas of elhigh county,
Peter Shive, the defendant's intestate,.made deposits in the
WRIT
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Dimes Saving Institution, receiving certificates of deposit. After
his death suit was brought on these certificates by John A. Greup,
who claimed them by virtue of an assignment upon them as
f.llows:"For value received, I assign the within note to John A. Greup,
" PETER SHIVE."
this 10th of August 1864.
The administrators of Peter Shive denied the genuineness of the
signature of Peter Shive to these assignments, and suits having
been brought against the Dimes Saving Institution, an agreement
Was entered into, to try the following questions, to wit: 1st,
Whether the assignment -of the certificates of deposit were in the
handwriting of Peter Shive. 2d,. Whether the said certificates if
so signed by the said Peter Shive were delivered to John A.
Greup, during the lifetime of the said Peter Shive. 3d, Whether,
if the assignments were so signed and delivered, a valuable consideration passed between the said Shive and the said Greup.
On the trial the defendant offered " to prove the handwriting
of John A. Greup, and to establish the genuineness of several
specimens in which the name of Peter Shive has been written by
said John A. Greup, the plaintiff, in order to submit the said speci3cens to the jury to compare wit the signatures in dispute on this
trial, averred to be the signatures of Peter Shive."
This offer the court rejected, whereupon the defendants offered
"to prove tbt the signatures to the assignments are in the.hand-"
writing of John A. Greup, and for the purpose of proving this
fact, they offer in evidence specimens of the handwriting of John
A. Greup, in which he has written the nanie of Peter Shive, to be
submitted to the jury to compare with the'signatures to the assignments in suit."
This offer was also rejected. These rulings of the court were
assigned for error.
The jury were instructed to find a special verdict, and after
deliberation brought into court a sealed verdict in the following
words:
" 1. We agreed to detrume wether the assignment of the curtificates of deposits upen wich suut wure brought is in the proper
haiadwritening of Peter Shive their estate.
2. We agreed wether the said curtificuts, is so signed by the
said Peter Shive, wether the same were delived to the said John
A. Greup.
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8. We agreed for value during the lifetime of the said Peter
Shive. Verdick in favor of the Plentiff."
The court, without sending the jury back to their room to correct their verdict, changed the same at bar, under exception from
the defendants' counsel, and asked them whether the following
was their intended verdict, to.wit:"1. That the signatures are in the proper handwriting of Peter
Shive. *
2. That the 'certificates were delivered to John A. Greup in the
lifetime of Peter Shive.
3. That the same were delivered to John A. Group for value."
The jury assenting to this the court entered it as their verdict.
This action was also assigned for error.
"Tohn ZD.Stiles, for plaintiffs in error,-cited F armers' Ban. v.
Whitehill, 10 S. & R. 110; MeOorkle v. Binns, 5 Binn. 349 ;
.Lodge.v. Phiph'er, 11 8. & R. 334 ; Travis v. Brown, 7 Wright
9; Greenl. on Ev. § 581. On the matter of the verdict, he
argued that the judge should have sent the jury out to reform
th.ir verdict, and not altered it himself, citing Reitenbaugh v.
I -adwick, 7"Casey 132, to show the practice in such cases.
Jhn ff. Oliver, for defendant in error"
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-In this state the rule respecting proof of hahdwriting in civil cases, by comparison *ofit with other writings
admitted to'be genuine, or proved to be genuine beyond a doubt,
appears to-be this: The comparison can be made only by the jury,
and it is not allowed as independent proof. It can be used only
as corroborative. After evidence has been adduced in support
of a writing, it may be strengtened by comparing the writing in
-question with other genuine writings,- indubitably such. Beyond
shis our cases do not go: Bdnk v. Whitehilil 10 S. & R. 110;
Travis v. Brown, 7 Wright 9. And this is a departure from the
English rule, which excludes other writings entirely, when offered
for the 'mere purpose of enabling the juryto judge of th.e handwriting by comparison, for reasons that must be admitted to have
great weight. But even under our relaxed rule the evidence
offered in this cdse and rejected was inadmissible. The question
at the trial was whether Peter Shive had .signed certaii assign.
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inents of certificates of deposit, purporting to have been made to
John A. Greup, the defendant in error. After he had given con
siderable evidence to show that the signatures were in the handwrit
ing of Shive, and had rested his case, the plaintiff in error called a
witness who testified to his belief that the signatures to the assignments were not those of Peter Shive. They then offered to establish
the genuineness of several writings in which the name of Peter Shive
had been written by'John A. Greup, in order to submit them to
the jury tocompare with the signatures to the assignments. This
being rejected, they renewed their offer in another form. They
proposed to prove that-the signatures to the assignments were in
the handwriting bf John A. Greup, and as the means of such
proof they offered in evidence specimens of the handwriting of
Greup, in which- he had written the name of Peter Shive; to be
submitted to the jury for comparison with the signatures to the
assignments. This offer was also rejected.
Up to the time when these offers were made there was no evidence whatever that Greup had forged the name of Shive, or that
the- signatures were in Greup's handwriting. No witness had
expressed such a belief, or intimated a suspicion to that effect.
The evidence offered was not then corroborative of anything that
had previously been proved, or of anything with which it was pro.
posed to follow it. Assuming, as we do, what does not clearly
appepar, that ihe offer was to establish indubitably the genuineness
of Greup's handwriting -in the specimens, yet, when. that was
-stablished, they could not have been received until ground had
been laid for their introduction by other proof that Greup wrote
the signatures to the assignments of the certificates. Were this
not so, they would be primary and independent evidence of a fact,
when the law declares them admissible only as corroborative.
True, when the offers were made, it was alleged that Greup signed
the name.of Shive, but it was alleged without evidence, and there
was, therefore, nothing more than an allegation to be corroborated.
The belief-of a witness that the signatures to the assignments were
not in the handwriting of Peter Shive was not the first step toward
proving that Greup wrote them. For myself, I doubt whether if
there had been some evidence that the signatures to the assignments were written by Greup, it could have been corroborated by
comparison with other specimens of his writing, admitted or
clearly proved to be genuine. No case in our books has gone to
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that length, and so broad a doctrine has never been asserted.

Even then it would have been allowing the jury to draw an inference of one fact, from another fact, itself only an inferential conclusion. For the question in this case was whether Peter Shive
wrote the signatures. It is, however, not necessary to decide
this.
If the testimony was admissible in this case the plaintiffs in
error might have gone on and submitted specimens of the handwriting of other persons A., B., C., and D., indefinitely, specimens selected by themselves, that the jury might determine from
comparison whether some one of them had not written the signatures, and therefrom infer that Peter Shive had mot. The danger
of fraud in the selection of specimens, and the danger of surprise
to the opposite party, are too great to warrant the allowance of
any such instruments of proof. The 1it and 2d assignments-of
error are not'sustained.,
The. 3d assignment is, that the court directed a verdict different
from the finding of the jury. We do not understand such to have
been the fact. The verdict is the one rendered in court, not that
which had been sealed up and'brought in. The paper brought in
by-the jury in this case was exceedingly unlettered, but it was a
general verdict for the plaintiff below, and without asking an
explanation from the jury the court might have moulded it into
the form in which the verdict was recorded. The court siinpiy
asked an explanation, and it was given in open court. Then the
jury declared that they meant to find whiat the record shows their
verdict to have been. In all this we discover no error.
Judgment affirmed.

United States Circuit Court,'Sout ern District of Ncw York.
ARCHIBALD HOPKINS v. ALEX. F. WESTCOTT ET AL.,
* A person receiving a printed notice on his ticket or check at the time of delive"
ing his goods to a carrier is to be charged with actual knowledge of the contents
of the printed notice.
Where such a notice stated that the carrier would not ,be responsible "for merchandise or jewelry. contained in -baggage, receivedupon baggage checks, ncw fox

loss by fire, nor for an amount exceeding $100 upon any article; unless specially
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agrced for," &c., the words " any article" mean any separate article, not a trunk
with its contents. The language bears that construction, and must be taken strictly
against the carricr.
Therefore, a traveller who gave a single trunk to a carrier and received such a
notice, was allowed to recover the value of separate articles in the trunk amounting
to $700.
Baggage includes such articles as are usually carried by travellers. Books an'
even manuscripts may be baggage, according to the circumstances and the business
of the traveller.
In this case a student gbing to college was allowed to recover the value of manuscripts which were necessary to the prosecution of his studies.

THIS was an action against an express company for loss of
baggage. The following facts were agreed upon:'The defendants' are carriers of baggage in the city of New
York.
The plaintiff-delivered to the defendants a railroad baggage
check to enable them to obtain his trunk at the depot, and deliver
the same at his residence in the city, no rate of compensation
being named.
The def6ndants obtained the trunk, but lost it.
Updn the delivery of the check to the defendants, they delivered
to the plaintiff a paper upon which the number of the check was
indorsed, and which contained also the following printed matter:
"The Westcott Express Company will not become liable for merchandise 6r jewelry contained in baggage received upon baggage:
checks, nor fr loss by fire, nor -for an amount exceeding "0100,.
upon any article, unless -specially agreed for in writing on this
check-receipt, and the extra risk paid therefor * * And the
owner hereby agrees that the Westeott ExpreSs Company shall be
liable only as above." This printed matter, however, the plaintiff did not read at the time it was delivered to him, nor till after
notice from the defendants that his trunk was lost.
The general custom of express companies is -to charge forty
cents for every trunk, and twenty-five cents in-addition for every
$100 of value beyond 8100. Plaintiff was ignorant of this custom.
The defendant was a student at Columbia College, and was proceeding to New York for the purpose of prosecuting his studies
at that institution; -and certain manuscript books which formed
part of the contents of his trunk, were necessary to the prosecution of his studies.
SHIPMAN, J.-It

has been remarked by a learned and accurate
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writer, "1that a common carrier may qualify his liability, by a
general notice to all who may employ him, of any reasonable
requisition to be observed on their part in regard to the manner
of entry and delivery of parcels, and the information to be given
him of their contents, the rates of freight, and the like ; as, for
example, that he will not be liable for goods above the value of .
certain sum, unless they are entered as such and paid for accordingly :" 2 Greenleaf's Ev. § 215. But in the case now before
the court, the defence does not rest upon a general notice, constructive knowledge of which the plaintiff is to be charged with
by proof that it was generally ad widely promulgated. It rests.
on a special printed notice, put into the hands of the plaintiff at
the time he delivered his check to the defendants. It can make
n, difference that the plaintiff did not choos6 to read it until after
h, had notice that his trunk was lost. He received it at the time
ht, parted with his check; it was legibly printed, and he must be
charged with actual notice of its contents. By its terms it qualified the duty or liability of the defendants, and limited their
responsibility in case of loss to an amount not exceeding $100
for *anyarticle, unless the plaintiff should disclose such articles,
and have the fact indorsed on the paper, as well as pay for the'
extra risk. It excluded all liability for merchandise and jewelry.
Though, as will be seen in the sequel, this point is of no practical
importance in this suit, in view of the construction which I shall
give this notice, yet I am unwilling to leave it to be inferred that
I entertain any doubt of the power of t.e carrier to qualify his
responsibility by special notice actually given to the owner under
circumstances like these. In The Orange Countyq BanAkv. Browin,'
9 Wend. 115, Judge NELSON, speaking for the court,.says of the
carrier: If he has given general notice that he will not be liable
over a certain amount, unless the -value is made knowni to him at
the time of delivery, and a premium for insuraice is paid, such
notice, if brought home to the knowledge of the owner (and
couits and juries are liberal in inferring such knowledge from
the publicati'on of the notice), is as effe'ctual -in qualifying the
acceptance of the goods. as a special agreement, and the owm~er
must, at his peril, disclose the value anid pay the pImium."
I[ere,'in the case before us, we are not left to a general -notice to
be charged upon the plaintiff on the ground of its general publication, and which, though he had seen, he might have forgotten;
"
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but the notice was served upon him at the time'he sought the ser.
vices of the carrier. * I can have no doubt, therefore, that the
Dlaintiff was bound by the notice, and that the carrier incurred
no responsibility which his notice, properly construed, excluded.
But here a more difficult question presents itself. The list of the
contents of this trunk and the value of each article thereof are
agreed to, and they amount in the aggregate to $744.10. It was
contended on the argument that the notice. limited the liability
of the carrier to $100, unless a greater value was disclosed, and
that, as no greater value was disclohed, judgment should be rendered for that sum only. But so far from giving this notice. a
liberal construction in favor of the carrier, I am inclined to construe it strictly against him. The rule which holds carriers to
strict responsibility is founded upon high considerations of public
policy and the security of the property of travellers. -Every
limitation of this responsibility should be expressed in each case
in clear and unequivocal terms. Notices of this character should,
therefore, be construed strictly against the carrier. They are
given, to travellers of all ages and sexes, in the bustle of rapid
transit from one place to another, in crowded vehicles and depots,
and they should be free from all doubt or ambiguity, so that their
contents should be clearly apprehended at a glance. Now, some
portions of the defendants' notice in this dase are clear and- explicit. It de.elares thatVthey will not be* liable for merchandise
or jewelry contained in baggage received upon baggage-checks;
No matter what their value, they do nat choose to engage in the
transportation of such articles as baggage. . They further give
notice that they will not be liable for losses by fire. Where there
is no question of gross or wilful neglect, or recklessness, or malfeasance, or misfeasance, these restrictions being plainly expressed
and communicated to the owner at the time of the engagement,
without doubt are binding upon him. But after designating mer
chandise and jewelry, and exempting them, as well as losses by
fire, the notice adds: "Nor for an amount exceeding .100 upon
any article unless specially agreed for in writing on this, checkreceipt, and the extra risk paid thereon." The.question arises,
whether the term "any article" here refers to a trunk or piece
of baggage and its entire contents in gross; or whether it is to
be confined to each separate article contained therein. In other
words, does it limit the liability of the carrier for the loss of a
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trunk and*its contents, or does it leave him liable for each article
contained in the trunk, according to its value, not exceeding $100
for any .single item ? The terms "merchandise" and "jewelry"
refer expressly to articles "contained in baggage received upon
baggage-checks"-that is, to the contents of trunks and packages, and excludes liability upon the articles specified. When
limiting the liability to $100 upon any one other article, I think
it should be held also to refer to the separate contents of the
trunks or packages, and not to the whole in gross. This strict
harmony with the policy of the law, and essenconstruction is in.
tiM to the protection of the community in view of the constant
devices of carriers to escape the responsibilities of their calling,
while their eagerness to obtain the patronage, of the public remains
unbated. Now I can well conceive that they are unwilling to take.
the risk of carrying expensive articles of dress, such as costly
furs, shawls, and other .valuable paraphernalia of an extravagant
modern wardrobe, a single item of -which is often valued at many
hundreds of dollars, without notice of value and pay for the risk.
But it may well be doubted whether they intend by such notices
as the one.under consideration to apprise the'owner that they
decline all responsibility beyoild $100 on each trunk and its contents, unless a special contract is made. A'good trunk is worth
half that sum, and often more, and the value of an ordinary
traveller's trunk and necessary contents would usually exceed
that sum. But whatever be the intentions of carriers, they niust
be so expressed as to leave no room for doubt as to their meaning,
or they cannot be permitted to qualify their liability -as fixed.by
the general rules of law applicable to their calling. As was
remarked by BEST O. J., in Brooke v. Pickwick, 4'Bing. 218,
"If coach proprietors wish honestly to limit their responsibility,
they ought to announce their terms to every individual who
applies to their office, and at the same time to place in his hands
a printed paper specifying the precise extent of their engage.
ment." And certainly where they make po oral communication,
but merely thrust into the hand of the traveller a small printed
ticket, the notice which that contains should be explicit, and Ieave
nothing to be made out by construiction. Where there is any
loubt as to its meaning, it should be construed strictly as against
the carrier.
As to the general custom of express companies to charge extra
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for every package over $100 invalue, I do not think that has any
bearing on this case. Even admitting that they could change
their liabilities by a sweeping custom (which may well be doubted),
no price was demanded or named in this case, and, therefore, the
custom has no bearing upon the controversy. Among the contents of this trunk were five manuscript books, no one of which
exceeded in value $100, but the defendants insist that they are
not liable at all for .these, on the alleged ground that they cannot
be properly termed baggage. In Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill
589, Judge BaoNsoN remarks: "An agreement to carry the ordinary baggage may well be implied from the usual course of business ; but the implicati6 n cannot be extended a single step beyond
such things as the traveller usually has with him as a part of his
luggage. It is undoubtedly difficult to define with accuracy what
shall be deemed baggage within the rule of the carrier's liability.
I do not mean to say that the articles must be such as every man
deems essential to his comfort, for some men carry nothing, or
very little, with them when they travel, 'while others consult their
convenience by carrying many things. Nor do I mean to say
that the rule is confined to wearing app'arel, brushes, razor, writing apparatus, and the like, which most persons deem indispensable,
If one has books for his instruction or amusement by the way, or
carries his gun or fishing-tackle, they would undoubtedly fall
within the term baggage, because they are usually carried as such.
This, I think, "agood test for determining what things fall within"
the rule." Now, it may" safely be said that books constitute to
some extent a part of the baggage of every intelligent traveller,
and especially is this the case with scholars, students, and members of the learned professions. There is no reason why they
should not be under the protection of the law as against the
negligence of carriers, as well as any other portions of their
luggage.
But, it is said that no case can be shown where the carrier has
been held liable for.manuscripts. No such case has been cited,
and, in my researches, I have found none. But I see no reason
for adopting a rule by which they should be excluded under all
circumstances from the list of articles termed baggage. With
the lawyer going to a distant place to attend court, with the author
proceeding to his publishers, with the lecturer travelling to the
place where his engagement is to be fulfilled, manuscripts often
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form, though a small, yet indispensable, part of his baggage.
They are carried as such, in his trunk or portmanteau, among his
other necessary effects. They are indispensable to the object of
his journey, and,, as they are carried with his baggage in accordance with universal custom, I see no reason why they should not
be deemed as necessary a part of his baggage as his novel or
fishing-tackle. In the present case the manuscript books lost are
admitted to be necessary articles for the student at the institution
to which he was proceeding. They must, under all the oircumstances, be deemed a part of his baggage, for which the defendants are liable. There was one article of jewelry in the list for
which, of course, they are not responsible, as, all jewelry was
excepted by specific designation. This, however, will make no
difference with the amount of the judgment, as by the stipulation
of the parties it is not to exceed $700, the sum demanded in the.
declaration, and the aggregate of the agreed value of the list is
$744.10. Let judgment be entered for the plaintiff for $700,
with costs.

Uircuit CVourt of the United State8, Northern Districtof Illinois.
DION BOURCICAULT v. JOSEPH H. WOOD.
Under the Act of 1856 an author who has filed a copy of his title-page but not
yet published his play, may have aii action at law for damages for the represintation of his play without his consent.
A resident, in the meaning. of the Copyright Acts, is a person domiciled in this
country, not a mere sojourner.
In an action for infringement of copyright in a play, the copyright and the fict
of representation being established, the burden is on defendant to show the author's
consent to the representeition. Mere publication is not permission to perform it.'
A foreigner, resident in this country, who.has filed a copy of the title-page of a
play, but has not published, is entitled to the protection of the Copyright Laws,'
but a subsequent publication in a foreign country would be an abandonment of his
rights under the Copyright Act of this country.

If there has been no publication at all by the author of a play, h has a right at
common law to damages for the representation.of his play from a manuscript

obtained without his consent.
DION BouOCccuLT, the plaintiff,. a foreigner, resided 'in the

United States from 1854 to 1861, and, whilst in New York, com.
posed and took measures to copyright three plays, "Pauvrette; or
the Avalanche," "The Octoroon," and the " Colleen Bato."
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He deposited the printed title-page of" Pauvrette" in the clerk's
office of the District Court of the Southern District of New York,
in September 1858, printed the book in October 1858, and.at that
time deposited a printed copy of the work, as provided by law, in
the same clerk's office.
He deposited the title-page of "The Octoroon" with the clerk
on December 12th 1859, and of "The Colleen Bawn" March
23d 1860, and never.printed or published either of these two.
Wood, the defendant, in 1864, 1865, and 1866, was proprietor
of "Wood's Museum," in Chicago, in which at various times
during these years he caused the above three plays to be repre..
sented without license, from Bourcicault.
This was an action on the case to recover damages for the
wrongful representation of these plays.
The declaration contained seven counts.
1. A count as to "Pauvrette," alleging the steps taken to
secure the copyright, and the infringement.2. As to "The Octoroon," alleging the deposit of the titlepage, and that'the play had never been published by plaintiff, or
with his consent, and the infringement.
3. As to "The Colleen Bawn," substantially the same as the
2d count.
4. A count at common law, alleging that the plaintiff is the
author and proprietor of "The Octoroonl" a play never published
by him nor with his consent, nor ever generally given to the pub-'
lie by him, but still inr manuscripf, from"thd fe'presentation of
which, by his license, he has derived profit, That the defendant,
without having been able to do so from any previous representation of it, nor from memory, nor from its .production to any
audience, but solely from a manuscript copy of it surreptitiously
•;nd wrongfully obtained, represented it at various times at his
theatre.
5. A count at common law similar to the 4th, as to "The bolleon Bawn."
6. A count at common "lawas to "The Octoroon," similar to
the 4th, with the difference that. it alleged that the defendant
produced it from a printed eopy wrongfully and surreptitiously
printed by some one unknown to the plaintiff, and without his consent, and surreptitiously obtained by defendant.
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7. A count at common law similar to the 6th, as to "The Colleen Bawn."
The plea was the general issue, as provided by statute, and the
defences made under it, without and with notice, were:1. That at the time he sought to copyright the plays plaintiff
was not a resident of the United States, within the meaning of
the Act of 1831.
2. That no sufficient steps had been taken by him to secure a
copyright.
8. That he had not deposited a printed copy of "The Octoroon" and "The Colleen Bawn," in the clerk's office.
4. That, to secure his copyright on "The Octoroon" and "Colleen Bawn," they must have-been printed and published.

5. That Mr. Bourcicault has for years allowed these plays to
be performed all over the country, and has permitted printed
copies of "The .Octorobn" and " Colleen Bawn" to be sold by
publishers and booksellers without restraining or prosecuting
them, aid has, therefore, abandoned all his rights to them, if any
he had, as well under the statutes of the United States as at
common law:
- 6. That the action (on the case) could not be maintained, the
only remedy being in equity.
Joseph P. Clarkson, for plaintiff.
Geo. 0. Bates, for defendant.
DRUMMOND, J., charged the jury as follows:The Act 6f 1831 protected the author of any book in the right
to print and publish such book, provided he was -a citizen of the
United States, or a resident therein. The fourth section of that
act declared how such author should proceed, in order to make
that protection available to him. It declared that he should not
be entitled to the benefit of the act unless, before publication, he
deposited a printed copy of the title of the book in the clerk's
office of.the District Court of the district wherein he resided.
I The fifth section declared that no person, should be entitled. to
the benefit of the adt unless he gave information of the copyright
being secured, by causing to be inserted in the copy of each and
every edition published, during the term secured, on the title-page
or the page -immediately following it, a notice of the fact of such
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right being secured to him, and the words by which such notice
was to be given were specified in that section.
The sixth section of the act provided for the recovery of certain penalties if any person or persons,.after the recording of the
title of the book, should publish, import, or cause to be printed or
imported, any copy-of such book, without the consent of the person legally entitled to the copyright thereof first had in writing,
and a forfeiture in money could be enforced by an action of debt.
The seventh section made the same provision substantially in
relation to certain other works, such as. a print, cut or engraving,
map, chart, or musical composition.
It is apparent from what has been stated in relation to these
various sections of the law of 1831, that there was a right of
action before the -publication was actually made.. The fourth section of the act provided that the author of a book within -three
months from the publication should cause to be- delivered a copy
-f the same to the clerk of the district; but, from what has been
already stated,.it is 'clear that a right of action accrued before
the deposit -ofthis copy of the book, because the language of the
sixth and seventh sections is express, that, if any other person or
persons, from and after the recordingof the title of the book,
should violate any of the provisions of those sections, they were
liable to an action for the benefit of the author, so -that, underthe
Act of 1831, there can be no doubt that not only a'suit in equity,
but at law, could be maintained before the publication- of the "
work, for the benefit of any party aggrieved.
Turning, then, -to the Act of 1856,-and. construing it by the
light thrown upon the subject -by the previous Act of 1881, the
question is, what rights there are under the.more recent statute.
The act was declared to be supplemental to the Act of 1831,
and it set forth that any copyright hereafter granted under the
laws of the United States, to the author or proprietor of any dramatic composition, designed or suited for public representation,
shall be deemed and taken to confer upon the said author or proprietor, his heirs or assigns, along with the sole right to print and
publish the said composition, the sole right, also, to act, perform,
or represent the same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented on any stage or public place, during the whole period for
which the copyright is obtained.
It will be observed that this act speaks of a copyright being
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obtained and granted, but it is clear that it does not necessarily
mean that the title of the work shall be deposited with the clerk
of the District Court and publication made, because that is not
the meaning of the term in the original law, to which this is supplemental, as will be seen from what has been already said. The
language of the fifth section of the Act of 1831 is, that no person
shall be entitled to the benefit 6f this act, unless he shall give
information of the copyright. That sect*ion must be construed
with the other sections which immediately follow it, the sixth and
seventh, and, of course, it is not intended by this language to
deprive of his action a party who may be injured between the
time of filing the title in the clerk's office and the time of .publication." As I have already said, it in terms giyes the right of action
in such case. Then, this supplemental act does not necessarily
mean by the term "copyright being granted," that thd book has
been published and notice given; otherwise the author of a book,
under the Act of 1831, would have a more complete remedy than
the author of a play under the supplemental Act of 1856 ; so that,
comparing the two acts together, and construing the latter act by
the light thrown upon the subject by the various provisions of the
prior act I think we may arrive at a conclusion as to what is the
meaning of this clause of the Act of 1856, namely,*" and any
nanager, actor, or other person, acting, performing, or repr'esenting the said composition without or against the- consent of .said
author or proprietor, his heirs or assigns, shall be lialtle for dimages, to be sued for and recovered by an action on the case, or
other equivalent remedy, with costs of suit, in any court of the
United States; such damages, in all cases, to be rated and
assessed at such sum not less than one hundred dollars for. the
first and ffty dollars for every subsequent performande, as to the
court having cognisance thereof shall appear to be just.;'" and it is
this: that the Act of 1831 having given a right of adtion between
the time of filing the title of the book in the clerk's office, and the
time of publication the above clause in the supplemental act also
gives the right of action.
It sebms to me that a little reflection will convince us thdt
that must be necessarily so, and must have been the intepntion of
this supplemental act. It is plain that the reason why-the act
was passed was, because the prior law did, not give sufficient protection to the author of a play. The principal profits derived from
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plays are the r representations on the boards of a theatre. Now,
it is apparent that if that representation could be made, at any
time, without the consent of the author of the work, he would be
injured pecuniarily in the profits to be derived from his work,
because it is from that source, principally, that the profits are
expected to come. The injury, it is apparent, would be just as
great, and, in most instances, it may be presumed, greater, by the
representation of his. play before its publication; than it would
after. Take the case of the composition of a dramatic work and
notice given, as the law requires, by leaving the title-page with
the clerk, and after that is done, the obtaining, by clandestine or
surreptitious means, of a copy of that play, and representing. it
upon the stage of a theatre publicly. That, of course, would be
an injury, pecuniarily, to the author. The question, . then, is,
whether this law did not intend to protect the author against, such
use without his consent. I think that it did. I thinl when it
says that any manager, actor, or other person who shall represent
the composition without the consent of the author shall be liable
for damages, to be sued for and recovered by an action on the
case, it means as well a representation made before as after pub;
lication.
Undoubtedly the Act of 1831 contemplated a publication
after the filing and deposit of a printed copy of the title-page of
the work in the clerk's office, but it did not specify how soon that
publication should be made; and, as in this case, there is evidence
of the representation of "The Octoroon" and " Colleen* Bawn,"
in various pars of the country for some time past, yet, as there
is also evidence showing that for many representations made,
compensation was given to the plaintiff,'I am*not prepared to say
that, under the circumstances of this case, he has lost the right
of action merely in consequence of the non-publication by him of
these plays.
It is conceded that there would be a complete and perfect remedy
in a court of equity; and I do not know why there should not be
in a court of law. Action on the case means an action brought
in a court of law. It is under the words "other equival.ent
remedy," that the party would have recourse to a court of equity.
So that as to the main question of law there is in the case, I think
that the action can be maintained.
But of course there are other questions that must be decided in
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favor of the plaintiff before he can recover in this case, independent
of these questions of law. As you will have seen, gentlemen of
the jury., from what the court has already said, before a party is
entitled to the benefits of these acts, you must be satisfied that he
has brought himself within these provisions. A fundamental
principle is, that he must be a citizen or a resident of the United
States.
The first question for you to determine is, whether this plain
tiff is within this provision of the law. He was not born in the
United States, and has never been naturalized. The only questi-on is, is he a resident, or rather, was he a resident of the Uriited
States at the time that he filed in the office of the clerk of the
court of the Southern District of New York, the titles of the various
plays which are in controversy here, namely': "Pauvrette," "The
Octoroonf" and "1Colleen Bawn '?" The title of the first was filed
on the 2d of-September. 1858, the second the 12th of December
1859,.and the third on the 23d of March 1860. The question is,
whether at the time these acts were done by the plaintiff, he was
a resident within the meaning of these Acts of Congress. That
is a: mixed question of law and of fact. Residence ordinarily
means domicile or the continuance of a person in- a place, having
his home there. Of course it is not actually necessary that he
should be the occupant of his own house. He may be a boarder
or a lodger in the house of another. The main question in connection with this matter is as to the intention with which the man
or person is staying in a particular place. In order to constitute
residence it is necessary that a man should go to'the place and
fake up his abode there with the'intention of remaining; making
it his home, his place of abode. If he does that, then he is a resident of hat place, and we speak of this in contradistinction to
the case of a person who goes to a place with the intention of
remaining there temporarily, or .fora short time, without any idea
of taking up his abode or making his home there. This question
of residence or non-residence is not to be determined by the length
of time that the person may remain there. 'For example-a man
may go into a town and take up his abode there with the inten.
tion of remaining, and, if so, he may be said to become- a resident
of that place, although, in point of fact,'he may afterwards change
his mind, and, *ithin a short time, remove from that place, even
within a few months. The question, you.will seei that' is to be
VOL. XVI.-35
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determined, is the state of mind, accompanied with acts, of the
man at the time that he goes to the place and takes up his abode
there. So a person may go to .a town, and if he goes there with
the intention of only remaining for a limited time and of leaving
the town, although, in point of fact, he may remain there for a
year or more, still" it does not constitute him a resident of the
town or of the place, because he does not go there and take up his
abode with the intention or the purpose which existed in the other
case, so that it is not to be determined by the length of time, but
-by the intention existing in the mind of the person, coupled with
acts, which acts and intent are to indicate whether or or not he-is
a resident of the place.
Applying these rules to the case before you, it is for you to
determine whethel', under the evidence, this plaintiff has brought
himself within the case which I have supposed as necessary in
order to constitute a man a resident of a particular place.
The plaintiff came to this country, I think the evidence showed,
in 1853. He.remained here, pursuing his profession as an actor
and an author, until the fall of 1860 or the spring of 1861. He
went to New York and took up his abode in New York city, and
remained there some years. The question for you to determine
is, whether, when he was here pursuing his pr6fession, travelling
about the-country, from 1853 and so on up until the time that he
took, up what' we may call his residence (without meaning by that
such a residence as is spoken of in the Act of Congress) in New
York, he came here and continued here and in New York, with
the intention of remaining and taking up his abode as one of the
people of this country. When he took a house in New York city,
as it is claimed there is some evidence to -show that he did, did
he occupy that house with the intention of remaining in the country ? If he did with the intention of remaining permanently in
this country, then I think he was a resident within the meaning
of the law, although he might have changed his mind afterwards
and returned to EIlgland.
But you must believe from the evidence that the intention
existed at the time, and that he did not at that time intend to
return te England, but that his intention 'then was to remain here,
and that this idea of returning to England afterwards arose in his
mind; although there is no evidence, really, that I know of, of
his actual status in England, only that he has been there sifice
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1860 or 1861, managing a theatre. We only know that by the
defendant, and perhaps from another party. We do not .know
what his intention is, further than may be inferred from these acts.
So that, gentlemen, it is for you to determine, under the facts of
the case, whether, within this description of the term residence,
Mr. Bourcicault was, at the time these titles were filed in the
clerk's office in the Southern District of New York, a resident of
this. country. If he was, then I think he was entitled to the protection of these laws. If he was not, if he was a wayfarer, a
sojourner, a mere, transient person, then I think that he was not
entitled to their protection.
If he was a resident of the United States, then, being entitled
to the protection of the law, his rights are to be determined by the
law. In relation to the play of "Pauvrette," or what has been.
called by some of the witnesses, "The 'Avalanche, or Under.-the
Snow," there does not seem to be any serious controversy. A
copy of that plar was deposited in the clerk's office on the 6th
day of October 1858. So that as to that, if he were a resident.
Mr. Bourcicault complied in all respects with the law. It is not
claimed but that he did, so far as obtaining a copyright, as I
understand." That has been published, by which- we mean it has
teen printed, under the authority of Mr. Bourcicault himself, and
the only question would be, -whether the conduct of Mr. Bourcicault has been such, in relation to this play, as "to deprive him of
the protection of the Ac of 1856.
As I have already said, he had the right under -that act, and
the sole right, to print and publish that play. He had also the
sole right to act and perform it, or to cause it to be acted, p'erfoirmed, or represented on any stage or public place, and no persgn
could do oither one or the other without his consent. The only
question, ihen, in relation to this,'is, whether he was a resident,
or has consented to the representation of this play of " P auvrette," or !I Avalanche, or Under the Snow," by the defendant.
If ybu are satisfied that he has consented to it, then the defendant would not be liable for the performanc of that play.
In relation to this, as in relation to the other plays, you mnst,
of course, be satisfiedpthat the plays.performed were the identica,
plays of which Mr. Bourcicault was the author. It is not necessary that it shoitld be identical word for word, but ihe idea is
that another has not the right to use the work of Mr.-Bourci
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cauit's brain in the construction of a play, without his consent,
and the mere alteration of a portion of the language of the play
would not deprive Mr. B6uroicault of his protection under the
law, provided there was a use of the play in all respects, substantially. I think that there ought to be some affirmative evidence
introduced on the part of the defendant, that Mr..Bourcicault, by
:word or. deed, has consented to the performance of this play by the
defendant-" Pauvrette" I mean; because it is' perfectly cleax
that.the Act of 1856 gave the' right' to the author not only to perform, but to publish it, and declared that no one should perform
it without his consent. The mere fact that it was published did
not give others the, right to 'efiact -it or perform it in a theatre ;
it must be done with his consent'or" acquiescence, and there ought'
o'be some evidence.that it was'so:done by .the defendant.
As to the other plays, the' "Colleen Bawn" and the' ".Octoroon," there is no evidence that these- plays were ever piublished
by the plaintiff in this country, and 'the'only question for you to
determine would be,"so far as this country.is concerned, whether
the.use of the manuscripts of-these plays by the defendant, Via.
with the consent or acquiescence' 6f the.plhintiff.
There is evidence tending to show that these two plays wrere
published, that is, printed, and-that this .ptLblicdtion was made in
England. . I do not think that would nmake any difference as to
the right of the plaintiff, unless that'public'tion wasgwith the con-sent 'f -the plaintiff. If these" pla'ys .were published in Englan4'
with his consent, after'what" took place6 in this country, I think
that any A'merican actor or manager would 'have the right to iimport these plays from England. and use 'themn upon his stage. The
question for you to 'determine is, whether 'here is any evidence
satisfying you that this publication was made with the consent'
and under the authority.of Mr. Bourcicaui lt; I mean the publications that were made in England. You must be satisfied from
some evidence in the case that they were published with his consent, otherwise there would not be a right in an actor or.manager
to import them and represent them in ths country. But, it they.
were so published with his consent, I think they would'have that
right, because then there is an abandonment of the rights under
our laws, and he is placed simply in the position of an ordinary
English dramatist, who has made publication of his play in his
own country. He does not seek, in other words, to follow up the
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beginning of the protection which our law gave him, but resorts
zo publication in England, instead of publication in this country,
where, if he were a resident, he would have the right and would
be protected. So that the question for you to determine is, whether he did make the publication in England, and of that I think
there should be some affirmative evidence to satisfy you that such
is the fact.
This substantially, .with one other remark, disposes of the
rights of the party under the law in relation to copyright. That
law prescribes a particular penalty for the unauthorized performance of a play; in the first instance, not less than 6100, and for
every subsequent performance $50.; leaving a "certain discretion
with the court upon that subject; "as to the court having cognisance thereof shall appear to be just.". In other words, it does
not necessarily follow that in all cases the precise penalty fixed
to the violation ef the 1Mw shall be given, but the court is'to exercise a certain discretion in relation to the matter.
There is another branch of the case under which it is claimed
the plaintiff is entitled, to protection, and that is under what is
termed the -common-law right, irrespective and independent entirely of the statute, and .because there has been no publication
of the "Octoroon" and "Colleen Biwn"by Mr. Bourcicault, or
under his authority. If that be so, then he is entitled to the property in his work, existing in .manuscript, and iiobody can use it
without his consent, and if it isso used, every person so using it is
liable to respond in damages to him for such use. You will understand that there is no question raised in this branch of the, case. in
relation to*" Pauvrette," because that was published with his consent; and, if he is iot trotected under the law, he is not prQtected
at all, because, having published it himself, he has given it to the
public, and the only shield he. has i the law. But if he has not
published the other two, then, he is protected at the'common law
in the property of his manuscripts.
It is admitted on the part of the plaintiff that, if a play is performed.upon a publi6 'theatre, and there is a representation of the,
same from the mere fact of hearing the play performed, that does
not constitute a violation of the law. How far that may-be true,
it is not necessary for me to decide, because the evidence seems
to show that these plays were performed. i3ome times, at any rate,
by means of manuscripts. It is, then, necessary that it should be
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shown to your satisfaction that these were used with the consent
or acquiescence of the plaintiff.
The question for you to determine on this branch of the case is,
whether he has ever published these works, and if he has not,
whether the defendant has used them, obtaining them surreptitiously or from any person without his consent. He would have
a right to perform his own plays, to authorize their performance,
or he would have the right to dispose of his property, either in
whole or in part, to any one that he chose. The question for you
to determine is, if he has not published these works, if he has so
disposed of them or.acquiesced in the performance of these woeks"
by the defendant. I admit, also, that, conceding that he has not
published them, he may also act in relation to them, as to, perhaps,
deprive himself of the right of calling upon a person to respond in
damages for the representation ; that is to say, if he has, allowed
these plays to be represented throughout the community for a long
space of time, without license and without objection, knowing
the fact to be *so, then I think he may be considered to have
abandoned the use of them to the public.
But it must be apparent that it has been done with his knowledge and without objection on his part. That is to say, the facts
must exist to indicate that he consented or acquiesced in their
performance. .Otherwise he is not prevented from claiming-his
propetty in these plays. I mean, of course, his property at'common law, as has been explained to you.
But you will see that under this branch of the case, there is no
limit as in the statute, to the amount of damages; but it simply
then comes, if you believe that the defendant is responsible in
damages for the representation of these plays, to the question as
to the damages which the plaintiff has actually sustained by the
use of the plays by the defendant. That is a question of proof,
to be determined by the evidence in the case, and in ielation to
which you are to form your own conclusions. These plays were
performed, it appears," Colleen Bawn" and the " Octoroon," sixteen times-eight times each-by the defendant in his theatre.
It is for you to say, putting the case upon the ground of common-law right, if the plaintiff has been damaged, and to what
extent he has been damnified by these representations by the
defendant of these plays. As I have already said, there is no
question in this branch of the case in relation to " Pauvrette,"
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because that was published and his rights there stand upon the
statute,
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, of $900.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
OAKES AND WIFE .v. SPAULDING AND OAKES.
The owner is liable for injury done by an animal which is known to be fierce or
dangerous, though it does not belong to a classfer&e naturz.
Where such an animal is the joint property of two persons, one of whom allows
the other to have charge, of it, both-are liable to a person injured.

THIs action was brought to recover damages for an injury to Mrs.
Oakes, done "by a ram that was jointly owned by the defendants,
both of whom had been for a considerable time "aware that the
ram had an unusual propensity to butt, and had on several previous occasions attacked and butted persons."
It appeared, without dispute, that the plaintiff, -Effigene Oakes,
who is the wife of the other plaintiff, while engaged by direction
of her husband in driving his cows from the pasture of the defendant Oakes, was, without-fault on her part, violently attacked
by a ram, and seriously injured.
The testimony on the part of Spaulding tended to show that
about two weeks previous to the.injury'to Mrs. Oakes, the sheep
of the .two defendants were washed together; and the defen'dant
Oakes, of his own accord on that occasion, and without permission
of or consultation. with Spaulding, and in his absende, took the
ram and put him into the pasture aforesaid (Spaulding having no
interest in or control over it), where it remaine.d until the time
of the injury to Mrs. Oakes, iaking no measures to, prevent the
ram doing damage--defendant Spaulding, during all that time,
being wholly ignorant of the place at, or manner in, which the
ram was kept, giving no directions as to his' being restrained
from d.iing damage, nor being consulted in, respect to the keeping,
care, or management of the ram; and not knowing that the plaintiff's cows were being kept on any, land belonging to William E.
Oakes,-but soon after Oakes so took the ram, Spaulding was informed of it, and made no objections and gave no directions.
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The defendant Oakes made no defence, Spaulding only de.
fending.
French and Edmunds, for plaintiffs.
Hard and Shaw, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BAR ETT, J.-Without bringing into consideration other ele-

ments of the case at this stage of the.discussion, it seems proper,
in the first place, to d etermine what duty and liability the law
imposes on the owner of"such beast who has knowledge of such
propensity and habit in it. And we think the true view is well
stated in the opinions, taken together, of Barons PLATT and ALDERSON, in the-case .of 'Jackson and Wife v. Smithson, 15 M. &
W. Ex. R. 561. PLATT, B., said, "No doubt a man has a right
to keep an-animal which is ferm naturm, and nobody has a right
to interfere with him in doing so, until some mischief happens ;
but as. soon a" the animal has done an injury to any person, then
the act of keeping it becomes, as regards that person, an act for
which the owner is responsible." Applying this principle in that
case, in which auch a ranm was the subject, ALDERsON, B., said,
"In truth there is no distinction between the case of an animal
which breaks. through the tameness of his nature and is fierce, and
known by the owner to be so,'and one which is'ferce naturtv."'
In the case of Brown v. Carpenter,26 -Vt. Rep. 688, a ferocious
dog was the subject.

C. J. R

rDFIMasaid,." His being in the

presence of his keeper affords no safe assurance that his known
propensities will not prevail over the restraints of authority. That
is the case often with men, and always liable to be with ferocious'
animals; as is said by one judge, II think sufficient caution has
not been used. One who keeps a savage dog is bound so to secure
it, as to effectually prevent it doing mischief.'" These expres.
sions convey what this court regard as the true idea of the law -on
this subject-treating the words "keeper" and "keeps" as referring to the person who is chargeable with the duty of keeping. the
animal under safe restraint. The origin, development, and application of the law in this respect is well shown in the arguments
of counsel and notes, and the opinions of the judges, as the case
is reported, in Card v. Case, 57 E. C. L. R. 622. Popplewell
v. Peirce 10 Cush. 509, is to the same effect. These cases so
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fully bring to notice the -learning of the subject, that further
special references seem not to be required.
As resting on the relation of ownership solely, unmodified by.
peculiar circumstances, it would- he the clear duty of the ovner
of such animal effectually to restrain-iffroni practising its favorite
propensity upon persons who, otherwise, might accidentally, and
without fault on their part, be exposed to its assaults. And no
distinction can be made as to this duty between sole and joint
owners. What is the duty of the sole is equally the duty of the
joint owners; and what is the duty of one joint owner is equally
the duty of the other as to third persons, unless the peculiar circumstances of the given case should relieve the one or the other
from-that duty.
.This brings us to inquire whether what is shown in this case
thus relieves Spaulding from that duty? In this connection'let
it be noted that we, are not undertaking to decide questions in
cases not yet in existence ; -and so are not deciding what, in sup.posed cases, might operate to relieve an owner, either sole or joint,
from the duty of effectually restraining such an animal. The ram
had been kept by Spaulding up to the time of sheep-washing that
spring. It is to be inferred that he assented to the washing of the
sheep together. It does not'appear that the defefidant Oakes
acted ifi contravention of any right of Spaulding, as between
themselves, as joint owners, in putting the ram into his own.pasture, instead of taking it back to Spaulding's pasture. . Oalios,
in"Virtue of the joint ownership, had the same right to have the
ram in.his own pasture as Spaulding had to have it in his; and
that right -did not depend on expressed permission by the one to
the other. In whichever pasture it was, the duty resting on the
owner, of its effectual restraint, followed it. They sustained the
relation of joint *ownership voluntarily, and they thereby became
charged with the correlative duty, and such duty rested on each
personally. It was the incident result of the relation, that, as
between themselves; either might lawfully Aave the custody of the
property, and such custody, as to third persons, as touching the
rights ahd duties springing from ownership, was the custody of botri.
It enured to the benefit of both with reference to -rights of
property; it charged both with commensurate duties in reference
to it as properfy. Now it is noticeable, that the case does not
show' that Oakes did anything to prevent Spaulding from- having
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full co-oporation, either by advice, direction, or acts, in the modo
of keeping the ram. All that it shows, either by statement or
inference, is, that Spaulding did nothing about it after the sheep
washing-not so much as to inquire or interest himself to know
where, or in what manner, his fellow-owner was keeping the ram.
Being an owner of it, and knowing its propensity and habit of
doing violence to persons, and being charged with the duty
of effectually restraining, it, and'without protestation or countereffort permitting it to be in the pasture of his co-owner, and
voluntarily remaining ignorant both of the place and the manner
in which it was kept, and under these circumstances it committed
the alleged act of- violence and severe injury, he failed utterly to
fulfil the duty resting upon him, and stands as nakedly chargeable
with liability for'the damage done as if he aloue had owned both
the ram and the pasture in'which the injury was done. To this
view -of the case the instructions of the County Court to the jury.
were applicable, and we think they were clearly correct.
The.judgment upon the verdict for $1500 isaffirmed.

Supreme Court of Mihigan.
THE PEOPLE v.ROBERT GARBUTT.
.Eidene-Insanty-Ina criminal case where insanity is set up as a defence,
evidence that a brother of the accused has become insane from a'cause similar to
that which is claimed to have operated upon the accused, is admissible as having
some tendency to prove the hereditary transmission of insane tendencies.
Insanity-Burden of proof in criminal cases.-In criminal cases the burden of
proof rests upon the prosecution to establish all the conditions of guilt; and it does'
not shift to the prisoner where insanity is set up as a defence. In cases of homicide, the jury are to weigh all the evidence, and unless reasonably satisfied, not
only that the prisoner committed the act charged, but also. as to his criminal capacity and intent, their duty is to acquit.
It does not follow, however, that the prosecution .are required to put in evidence
of sanity before the defence has introduced evidence of the contrary condition.
Sanity being the normal condition of humanity, the prosecution may rest upon the
presumption that it exists, until evidence to rebut that presumption has been
given.
Drunkenness is no legal excuse for the commission of crime.
Good character tf the defendant in a criminal case.-Evidence of the good character of a defendant is always admissiblb in a criminal case, and when put in, the
jury have a right to give it such weight as they think- it fairly entitled.ro. Arbi.
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trary rules for this purpose cannot be laid down for their control. In some cases
on unblemished good character may not only raise a doubt as against the clearest
case upon the other evidence, but may even.bring conviction of innocence.
Requests'to charge.-Counsel cannot be absolutely precluded from having proper
instructions given to the jury, by a failure to hand in written requests before the
,qrgument, as desired by the judge. A direction to that effect by the judge ought
to be complied with, when practicable; but its observance must rest in professional
courtesy.

ON exceptions from the Recorder's Court of Detroit.
The defendant was convicted in the Recorder's Court of the
city of Detroit on an information charging him with the murder
of"one La Plante. No question was made that La Plante died
of a wound from a pistol fired by defendant, but it was .insisted
on behalf of defendant that it was inflicted'by him under circumstances of great provocation, sufficient to reduce the offence from
murder to manslaughter; and it was further claimed that he was
at the'time mentally incompetent of a criminal -intent, the reason
being -temporarily overthrown through the combined influence
of intoxicating drinks, the great provocation, and perhaps of
hereditary tendencies also.
AS lve8ter' Larned, for the defendant.

W. L. Stoughton, Attorney-General, for the People.
The opinion of the court-was delivered by,
-

CooLEY, C. J.-[After stating the case, and disposing of s6me

unimportant exceptions.]
The• most important questions arise upon the exclusion by the
recorder of evidence offered to show the insanity of a brother
of the prisoner, and upon his charge to the jury and refusals-to
charge as requested on behalf of defendant.
Those questions which relate to the discovery and proof of insanity in criminal cases are perhaps the most difficult of any with
. which courts anl juries are compelled to deal. Mental disease
is itself so various in character, so vague sometimes in its manifestations, and so deceptive, especially in its eaily stages, afid its
causes are so subtle and- so difficult to trace, that the .most xperienced medical men are sometimes obliged to confess that
however careful and thorough their investigations, they still
prove unsatisfactory, leaving the -mind not only in a condition of
painful uncertainty upon the principal question whether" mental
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disease actually exists, but when its actual presence is demonstrated, failing utterly, in many cases, to trace it to any sufficient
cause. This fact is very forcibly brought home to us by the. conflicting views'expressed on criminal trials by careful, experienced;
and conscientious medical men, who, regarding the same state of
facts in the light of their scientific- investigations and actual but
diverse experience, are forced to express different views, in consequence of which juries, in these difficult.cases, are sometimes
left in a state of greater- doubt and difficulty, if possible, than
if no such evidence had been -given.. The case of Freeman v.
People,.4 Denio 9, and the more recent and noted -ease of the
fqrger Huntingdon1, are conspicuous instance. in illistration of
this truth, but others will readily occur to the mind. ?
The defence-sought to show hereditary tendency to ifisanity onthe part of the defen.dant. That insane tendencies are transmitted
from-parent to child, there is no longer a doubt; and though it
was once ruled that proof that other xiembers of the same family.
have decidedly been insane is not adimissible, either in civil or
criminal cases (McAdam v. Wal.er,-I Dow. P. 0. 148, 174I
C0itty's Med. Juris. 354-5), yet this ruling has since been:
rejected as unphilosophical and unsound, and it'is now allowbd: to"
prove the insanity of either parent, or even:f a more remote
ancestor, since it is well established- that in'sanity sometimes disappears in o~ne generation and reappears in: the next: Taylor's
Me& Juris. 628-L-9, and cases-cited ; Whart. & Still6's Med. Juris.
85, et seg.

In the case at bar it was not claimed that either parent, or any
other ancestor, had been insane, but the defence-offered to show
that insanity had been developed in a brother arising from a.
cause-similar to that which, it was alleged, had induced the
destructive act of the defendant; and this fact was sought to'be
placed before the jury as throwing some light on the defendant's"
conduct and accountability.
Although this evidence could not be very satisfactory in character, we think it was legally admissible. It is now geinerally
believed that other things besides actual mental disease in- the
parents may cause the transmission of taints to their offspring,which result in some cases in idiocy or insanity. The children
of habitual drunkards are thought to be much more susceptible to
mental disease than those of persons whose habits have been cor-
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rect and regular, and the medical opinion has been expressed that
the children of those who are married late in life are also more
subject to insanity than those born under other circumstances:
Taylor's Med. Juris. 629. But it sometimes occurs that persons
in vigorous health and correct habits, who have nevertheless
entered into a marriage which violates some physiological law,
may become parents -of weak and diseased children only, so that
insanity enters the family for the first time in the person of the
children, but through qualities derived exclusively from the
parentage. Melancholy examples of this fact are presented sometimes in the case of the intermarriage of near relatives. The
reasons for this are not fully understood, and cannot be explained.
We can only say of such cases, that observation teaches us the
existence of a law of nature which cannot be broken with impunity, but the full boundaries, extent, and force- of which- we
are as yet unable to fully comprehend, point out, or explain. But
there are other cases where we may be able to discover effects
without the ability to point out either the law or the causes which
produce them. What peculiar combination of qualities in parents
may tend t9 produce niental perversion, weakness, or disease in
children, must for ever remain, in many cases, matter of profound
mystery. If a family of several children.should be found, without known cause, to be idiotic, or subject to mental delusions, the
inference of hereditary transmission would in many cases be entirely conclusive, notwithstanding the inability to point out any-.
thing of similar character in any ancestor. Insanity in a part
of the children only Would be less conclusive; but the admissibility of t.he evidence in these' cases cannot depend upon'its
quantity, and it could never be required- that it should amount.to
demonstrhtion. In some cases its force must be small ; in others
it will prove hereditary taint wifh great directness. We think
evidence of mental unsoundness on the part of a brother or sister
of the person whose competency is in question, is admissible, and
that the jury should be allowed to consider it in connection with
all the other evidence. bearing upon that sibject.
The counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge the
jury that if they believed the defendant was intoxicated to such
an extent as to make him uncoiscious of what he was doing at the
time of the commission of the offence, the defendant must be
acquitted. A doctrine like this would be a most alarming one to

,
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admit in the criminal jurisprudence of the country, and we think "
the recorder was right in rejecting it. A man who voluntarily
puts himself in condition to have no control of his actions, must
be held to intend the consequences. The safety of the community
requires this rule. Intoxication is -so easily counterfeited, and
when real it so often resorted to as a means of nerving the person
up to the commission of some desperate act, and is withal so
inexcusable in itself, that the law has never recognised it as an
excuse for crime: Commonwealth v.- Hawkcins, 2 Gray 468;
- United States v. Drew, 5 Mason 28; People v. Hdmmill, 2
Parker 223 , Pirtlev. -State, 9 Humph. 663. Whether all the
charges given by the recorder on this subject were correct, -we
'do not feel called upon to consider; as the only exception to the
charge as given, was a general one to the -whole charge, which is
not sufficient, when a part of it is correct, to raise questions upon
other parts.
The defendant's counsel also requested the court to charge the
jury that sanity is a necessary element in the commission of
crime,.and must be proved by the prosecution as a part of their
case whenever the defence is insanity. Also, that where the
defence makes proof of insanity, partial or otherwise, whenever
it shall be made to appear from the evidence that prior to or at
the tinie of the offence charged, the prisoner was not of sound
mind, but was.afflicted with insanity, and such affliction was the
effici'ent cause of the act,. he ought to be acquitted by the 'jury."
These requests were refused.
It is not to be denied that the law applie .able to cases of homicide where insanity is set up as a defence, is left in a great deal
of confusion upon the authorities ; but' this, we conceive, springs
mainly from the fact that courts have sometimes treated the
defence of insanity as if it were in the nature of a'special plea,
by which the defendant confessed the act charged, and undertook
to avoid the consequences by showing a substantive defence, -which
he was bound to make out by clear proof. The burden of proof
is held by such authorities to shift from the prosecution to the
defendant when *the alleged- insanity comes in question; and
while the defendant is to be acquitted unless the act of killing is
established beyond reasonable doubt, yet when that fact is once
made out, he is to be found guilty of the -criminal intent, unless by
his evidence he establishes with the like clearness, or at least by a
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preponderance of testimony, that he was incapable of criminal
intent at the time the act was done: Regina v. Taylor, 4 Cox C.
C. 155 ;. Regina v. Stokes, 3 C. & K. 188 ; State v. Brinyea,5
Ala. 241; State v. Spencer, 1 Zab. 202; State v. Stark, 1
Strob. 479. These cases overlook or disregard an important and
necessary ingredient in the crime of murder, and they strip the
defendant of that presumption of innocence which the humanity
of the law casts over him, and Which attends him from the initia
tion of the proceedings until the verdict- is rendered. Thus, in
Regina v. Taylor, supra, it is said: "In cases of insanity, there
is -one cardinal rule, never to be departed from, viz. : that the
burden of proving innocence rests on the party, accused."' And
in State v. Spencer, supra, the rule. is laid down thus: "Where
it is admitted or clearly proved that the prisoner committed the
act, but it.is insisted that he was insane, and the evidence leaves
the question of insanity, in doubt,'the jury ought to find against
him. The proof of insanity at the time of committing the act
ought to be clear and satisfactory, in order to acquit a prisoner
on the ground of insanity, as proof of committing the act ought
to be in order to find a"sane man guilty." These cases are not
ambiguous, and, if sound, they more than justify the recorder in
his charge in the case- before us.
The defendant was on trial for murder. Murder is said to be
committed when a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being, and under" the
king's peace, with malice aforethought, either express or implied:
3 Coke Inst. 47; 4 B1. Coi. 19.5; 2 Chit: Cr. L. 724. These
are the ingredients of the offence ; the unlawful killing, by a per.
son of sound mind. and with malice, or to state them more con
cisely, the killing with criminal intent; for there can be no
criminal intent when the mental cohdition of the party accused .is
such that he is incapable of forming one.
These, then, are the facts which hre to be established by the
prosecution in eyery case where murder is alleged. The killing
alone does not in any .case completely prove 'the-offence, unless it
was accompanied with such circumstances that malice in law'or in
fact is fairly to be implied. The prosecution takes upon itself
the burden of establishing not 6nly the killing, but also the malicious intent in every case. There is no such thing in the law as
a separation of the ingredients of the offence, so as to-leave a
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pait to be established by the prosecution, while as to the resi the
defendant takes upon himself the burden of proving a negative.
The idea that the burden of proof shifts in these cases is unpbilo.
sophical, and at war with fundamental principles of criminal law.
The presumption of innocence is a shield to the defendaiit through.
out the proceedings, until the verdict of the jury establishes the
fact that beyond a reasonable doubt he not only committed the act,
but'that he did so with malicious intent.
It does not follow, however, that the prosecution at the outset
.must give direct proof of an' actual malicious intent on the part
of the defendant; or enter upon the question of.sanity before the
defence have controverted it. The most conclusive proof- of
malice will usully spring from the circumstances attending the'
killing, and the.,prosecution could not well berequired in such
cases to go further than -to put -those circumstances in evidence.
And on the subject, of sanity, that condition being t6e nornial
state of :humanity, the prosecution are at liberty to rest'upon the"
presumption that the accused was sane, until that presumption is.
overcome by tihe defendant's evidence. The presumption establishes, primd facie, this portion of the case on the part of th'e
government. It stands in the place of the testimony of witneises,
liable to be overcome in 'the same way. Ne'vertheless it is a part
of the case for the government; the fact which it'-supports must
necessarily be. established before any -conviction can -be had.- and
wheii the jury come to consider the whole case upon the eiidence"
delivered to them, they must do so upon the basis that on each
and every portion of it they are to be reasonably satisfied before
they are at liberty to find the defendant guilty.
This question of the burden of proof as to criminal intent was
considered by this court in the case of Maier v. Tie People, 10
Mich. 212, and a rule was there laid down which is Qntirely satisfactory to us, and which we have no disposition to qualify in any
manner. Applying that'rule to the present case, we think the
recorder did not err in refusing to charge that proof of sanity'
must be given by the prosecution as a part of their case. They
are at liberty to rest upon- the presumption of sanity until'proof
of the contrary condition. is given by the defence. But -when any
evidence is given which tends to overthrow that -presumption, the
jury are to examine, weigh, and pass upon it with the understanding that although the initiative in presenting the evidence is
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taken by the defence, the burden of proof upon this part of the
nase, as well as upon the other, is upon the prosecution to establish the conditions of guilt. Upon this .point the case of People
v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58, is clear and satisfactory, and the cases
of Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 373; Commonwealth v.
Dana, 2 Met. 840; State v. Master, 2 Ala. 43; Commonwealth
v. McKee, 1 Gray 61 ; Commonwealth v. Rogers, Id. 500; and
Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 885, may be referred to in further illustration of the principle. See also Doty v. State, 7 Blackf. 427.
The recent case of Walter v. People, 82 N' Y. 147, does not
overrule the case of People v. McCann, but so far as it goes, ,is
entirely in harmony with the views here expressed.
The only remaining error alleged relates to the refusal of the
recorder to charge as requested upon the evidence adduced by
the defendant to establish his uniform good character previous, to
the time of the alleged offence. To understand this refusal it
must be known that the'counsel for the defendant had previously
been informed by, the court that any requests to charge the jury
should be handed in before he commenced his argument to the
jury. In compliance with this direction, seven written requests
were handed in, which were appropriately responded to. None
df these related to good character. The court, however, in the
charge alluded to the proof of good character, coupling it with a
caution to the jury not to give too much weight to the statement
the prisoner had made in the case, and which must be considered
as made under str.ong temptations to state that which was untrue
in his own exculpation. After this charge was given, the court
was asked to instruct the jury that they had a right to believe the
defendant's statement in opposition to sworn evidence; and this
charge was given; 'with'a repetition of the caution above stated.
The court was then further requested to charge that, as to good
reputation,'it is for the jury to consider whether-such reputation
tends to rebut the presumption.of malice. The count refused to
giver the charge, on the .ground that it might mislead the jury
without further explanation, which the court did not feel bpund
then to.give.
We infer from the bill of exceptions that the recorder declined
to give what he regarded as proper instructions on this point
because the request was not handed in at a prior stage of the case.
As a legal proposition, however, the refusal could hardly, be jus.
VOL. XVL-36
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tified on this ground. It is undoubtedly proper that requests to
charge should be handed in by counsel before they go to the jury
upon the facts; and a rule by the court to this effect ought to be
regarded as binding by counsel. Fairness to the judge, and corn
mon courtesy, would require that such a rule be complied with,
that he may have opportunity to carefully weigh his instructions,
and to reduce them to writing if he shall so desire. Counsel who
should decline to obey so reasonable a request- might justly be
regarded as wanting in that courtesy which distinguishes the
.members of the profession generally. in their 'intercourse with
each other, and which is. especially due from the bar to the judges
who bndeavor patiently to administer the law with impartiality
amid all the difficulties aud embarrassments that sometimes sur-"
round the trials.by. jury. "Nevertheless the rule cannot be laid
down as an unbending rule of law. The necessity for a request
to charge will sometimes arise from what has already been charged
by the judge. It may become important iii order to render more
clear and explicit that which 'he has already stated, but which has
fallen short of a complete exposition of the law upop.the point to
which his remarks have been addressed; And 'if in any case.thi
counsel should fail-to request the court to lay down those familiar
rules of law which it is always to be expected will -be -iven-A
the cases in which they were applicable--sich as -the erdessity
of malice in..murder, or a breaking in burglary-the defene
could not justly be precluded by such omission from having the'
proper instructions given.
It is quite possible that in the present case. counsel took it for
granted that the proper instructions would be given on the subject
of the proof of character without any request to that effect.
With many judges it is a matter of course to give such instructions, and it is to be presumed the recorder would have done so
in the present case had it occurred to him as important. But we
think the request of counsel did not come too late in this instance,
and he was entitled to have the proper instructions given.
We also think the instructions requested were correct in substance, and that the defendant was entitled to them without
explanation or qualification. The whole request was that the
jury be instructed that they had a right to consider whether the
evidence of good character tended to rebut the presumption of
malice. That the evidence was admissible in the case was un-
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luestionable; but it was equally unquestionable that it could have
ao bearing whatever except upon the question of malicious intent.
To refuse the instruction, therefore, seems to us equivalent to
.olding, or at least to leaving the jury to infer, that the evidence
which was lawfully put into the case was immaterial after it was in.
The instruction is often given in these cases that proof of good
character is not to be allowed to weigh against evidence which in
itself is satisfactory, and Mr. Starkie has said, "it ought never
to have any weight except in a doubtful case :" 1 Stark. Ev. 75.
Such instructions are well calculated to mislead. Good character
is -an important fact with every man, and never inore so than when
he is put on trial charged with an offence which is rendered improbable in the last degree by an uniform course of life wholly
inconsistent with any such crime. There are cases where it becomes -a man's sole dependence, and yet may prove suificient- to
outweigh evidence of the most positive character. The most clear
and convincing cases are sometimes satisfactorily rebutted by it,
and a life of unblemished integrity becomes a complete shield of
protection against the most skilful web, of suspicion and falsehood which conspirators have been able to weave.- Good charac.
ter may not only raise a doubt of guilt which would, not otherwise
exist, but may bring conviction of innocence. In every criminal
case it is a fact which. the defendant is at liberty to put in evidence ; and, being in, the jury have a right to give it such weight
as they think it entitled to. Chief Justice SHAw has pointed out
in the Webster Case how important it is ii the case of some minor
offences, and he adds that, "even with regard to the higher crimes,
testimony of good character, though of less avail, is competont
evidence to the jury, and a species of evidence which the accused
has a right to offer. But it behooves one charged with an atro.
cious crime, like this of murder, to prove- a high character, and
by strong evidence to make it counterbalance a strodig amount
of proof on the part of the prosecution :" Commonwealth v. Web8ter" 5 Cush. 295. In some cases it may have even this great
effect.
The difficulty at this point lies in attempting to surround .tle
jury with arbitrary rules as to the weight they shall allow to evidence which has properly been placed before them. This court
has several times found it necessary to declare that no such arbitrary rules are admissible. We refer particularly to 1mle cases of
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People v. Jenners, 5 Mich. 305; Maer v. People, 10 Id. 212;
and Durant v. People, 13 Id. 851. The trial of criminal cases
is by a jury of the country, and not by the court. The jurors,
.and they alone, are to judge of the facts and weigh tle evidence.
The law has established this tribunal because it is believed that
from its members, the mode of their selection, and the fact that
the jurors come from all classes of society, they, are better calculated to judge of motives, weigh probabilities, and take what may
be called a common-sense view of a set of circumstances involv-ing both act and intent, than any single man, however pure and
eminent he may be. This is the theory of the law, and as applied
to- criminal accusations it'is eminently wise and favorable alike
to liberty and to justice. But to give it full effect the jury must
be left to weigh. the evidence knd. to examine tho alleged motives
by their own tests. • They cannot properly be furnished for the
purpose with balances which leave them no discretion, but which,
under certain circumstances, will compel them to find a malicious
intent when they cannot conscientiously say they believe such an
intent.to exist.
Upon a full consideration of this case, we are compelled to say
we find some errors in the record, for which the conviction should"
be set aside, and a new trial awarded.
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Where a city charter required that all work should be let by contract to the
lowest bidder, held, that the city authoriies could not contract-at all for-laying the
Nicholson pavement, the right to lay it being a patented right and owned by a
single firm, and, therefore, the work being one which could not be open',to competition.

PAM, J.-This was a bill in equity to enjoin the sale of the
plaintiff's landd for an assessment imposed upon them for paving
the streets in front of them with what is known as the Nicholson
pavement. It is claimed that the proceedings failed in several
I We are indebted for the opinion in this case to. the Hon. 0. M. Coxovai,
Reporter for the State of Wisconsin.-EDS. AM. L&w REG.
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respects to comply with the provisions of the charter, in matters
so essential as to render the tax void. But another objection is
taken, which goes to the foundation of the whole proceeding; and
the conclusion to which a majority of the court have come fipon
that, will preclude the necessity of examining any of the other
questions. This objection is based upon the provisions of the
charter requiring all work to be let by contract to the lowest bidder, and the fact that the right to lay the Nicholson 'pavement is
a patented right, and was owned for the state of Wisconsin by
one firm in the city of Milw'aukie. It is said 'that the charter
authorizes a contract only for such work as is open to competition,
and that this work was not open to competition, because nobody
* had iny legal right to do it except the one firm that owned the
patent. Upon these facts alone the objection seems to me unanswerable. And nothing seems to be necessary, 'beyond *the
simple statemhent of the' requirement of the charter as to the mode
of letting work, and the fact 'that this right 'was a monopoly, to
show that the charter is inapplicable to it, and that a contract for
this work would be in violation of the necessary implication from
its provisions.
Indeed the counsel for the respondent by their course of argument, seemed tacitly to admit that there was an apparent incongruity in applying the provisions of the charter to a contract for
such 'work as this. And they sought to avoid it in two modes.
First, they claimed that if it was clear that the charter could 'not
be applied in such a case; that it would be a mere farce to'advertise tolet to the lowest bidder work which only-one firm had any
legal right to do, so that the v.ery object of the charter--to priocure' the work to -be done as cheaply as possible-might be defeated thereby; then it must be assumed that the legislature did
not intend the mode provided in the charter to be applicable, and
that the work might be contracted for' without regard to that mode.
The other mode of avoiding' the objection was by proving that
the owners of the patent were anxious .and willing to sell the
royalty, and had offered it for sixteen cents 'per square yard.
And upon this -proof it is-insisted that the principle of competiti6n
was preserved, and the requirements of the charter complied with.
I will state, as briefly as may be, why I think neither of these
theories overcomes the objection. The first assumes the correct
ness of the position that the charter cannot be applied to.a con.
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tract for work the right to do which is a patented monopoly. And
it then infers that because the charter is inapplicable, the city
had the general power to make the contract, without regard to its
restrictions, and that such was the legislative intent. The error
lies in this inference. This position was attempted to be sup.
ported mainly by the case of The Harlem Gas 0o. v. The Mayor,
ic., 33 N. Y. 309. The counsel on. both sides Tely upon that
case, and it will therefore be proper to examine it carefully to see
what position it sustains.
The action was on a contract for lighting certain streets in New
York city with gas. The company had by law the exclusive right
to furnish gas for that part of the city. The charter required all
contracts for wvork and 'supplies, beyond a certain limitation in
-value'which this contract far. exceeded, to be let by oontfact -to
the 'lowest bidder. 'The contract for this gas was not so let, and
therefore-it was claiied to be void. The court held that, inasmuch as &hecompany had the exclusive right to furnish the gas
the provision .,f the charter requiring the contract to 'be let to
thd lIwest bidder was inapplicable, and that it would be -absurd
to attempt to apply the provision in such a case.' PoRTE,.; J.,
-says: -" In -the present case, an adoption 'of the construition
claimed by the municipal authoities would lead to the absurd
conclusion tha- the legislature designed to force a provision -into
-the city charier compelling the corporation to pat whatever price.
-thesole bidder might choose to exact in his sealed proposals -for
the use of property in which he has an absolute monopoly, and in
relation to which there can be no competition -within the range of
legal possibility." BRowx, J., says: "Had the common council,
in place of this condition, invited proposals in the usual form,.
-there could have been but a -ingle offer at best, and the provisions
of the statute would have failed of effect, because they were not
applicable to such a subject."
The case therefore fully sustains the position of the appellant's
,counsel, -which seems obvious enough in itself, that a provision
requiring work to be let to the lowest bidder, is not applicable to
a contract for work as to which there can be no competition. And
if not applicable to it, of course it can furnish no authority for
such contract. And if such a contract is made, it must be sustained, if at all, by authority derived from some other source than
such a provision of the charter.
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But the court in that case did hold the contruct valid, and the
city liable, and this branch of the decision the respondent's counsel rely upon to sustain their position, that if the charter, was
inapplicable, these proceedings should be sustained, whether conducted in accordance with it or not. But the cases are so differ.
ent in respect to the grounds of that part of the decision, that it
becomes inapplicable here. The power to contract for the lighting of the streets of the city was assumed in that case to be one
of the general powers of a municipal corporation. Hence, so
soon as the court came to the conclusion that the mode of contracting pointed out in the charter was inapplicable in such a
case as they had under consideration, they h~d no difficulty in
sustaining the contract under the general corporate power of the
city. But here the question is quite different. It is not necessary to inquire whither the city of Madison, by virtue of 'its
existence as a municipal corporation, would have had thWe power
to contract for paving its streets with the N icholson pavement, at
the expense of the city, after discovering that the provisions of
the charter enabling it to cause its streets to -be paved at the
expense of the lots, were inapplicable for that purpose. If it had
such p-ower, and had made such a contract binding the city at
large, the question would then have been like that decided by the
New York court. But here it made no such attempt. It seeks
here to charge the expense upon the lots, andthis'it has no general
power to do by virtue of its mere existeuce as a municipal corporation; but, if done at all, it can -only be done under the statutory authority in its charter, and by complying substantially,..if
not strictly; with all its requirements. So soon, therefore, as we
arrive at.the conclusion that these requirements are inapplicable
and inadequate to a contract for a work, the right to do which is
an exclusive monopoly, it ends the question; -for there is no
general power of the city to fall back 'upon. I think, therefore,
that.-hie the case in New York does show that the contract in
this case was outside of the scope of the provisions of the charter,
it fails to show any -general authority in the city by which it
could 6e sustained, indefiendent of those -provisions. In truth,
-it would seem too late for us now to'say that these requirements
of the charter. are not applicable to contracts for paving*streets,
for the contrary has uniformly been held by this and othercourts :
Mfyrick v. La Cro8se, 17 Wis. 442; Mitchell v. Milwauhie, 18
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Id. 92; Kneeland v.Furlong, 20 Id. 437; Brady v. New York,
20 N. Y. 312.
Neither can I see that the other mode of answering the objection is successful. On proof that the owners of the patent were
willing to sell the "royalty," as it is called, for sixteen cents per
yard, it is said that other parties might have bid, and the prin
ciple of competition was preserved. If an arrangement had previously been made,'by which the owners of the patent became
bound to transfer the right at sixteen cents per yard, and the contracts had been let in pursuance of the charter, for the materials
and labor,'subject to the condition of obtaining the patent, the
pkinciple of competition, So far. as the labor and material were
concerned, might have been preserved. But even in -that cage
there could have been no competition as to the price of the royalty.
So far as that constituted a part of the cost, there was. no possibility of introducing this principle at all. But if the method
suggested had been resorted to, so as to preserve competition in
the labor and materials, perhaps the fact that it could not be preserved as to the comparatively small balance of the elxynf'e,
would not have avoided the whole. It is unnecessary th determine whether so strict an application of the-spirit of the charter
would have been required..
But nd such method was resorted to. On the contrary;'the
proposals we ie for furnishing the materials and doing the',work,.
without anything in regard to the price of the royalty,.and without any previous agreement with the owners of it. -There could
be no competition in this method. The fact that the owners were
willing to sell it at sixteen cents per yard, dbes not show that
there could have been. For, assuming that any contractor might.
have safely relied on the willingness of the owners to sell it at
that price,-assuming that the latter, in case they desired to bid
-for the work themselves, would not use their power over the patent
to aid in obtaining the contract, as far as possible, by preventing
others from getting it,-assumptions which it would scardely be
safe for contractors to act upon,-still, there could have been no
safety in bidding. For, suppose A., B., and C. all bid, none of
them making any previous arrangement for the purchase of the
royalty. Before the bids are opened, one of them thinking, to get
the contract, desiring in good faith to do the work, goes to the
owner of the patent and buys the royalty, for that part of the
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city where the work is ordered to be done. The bids are opened,
and some one else has the lowest bid, and gets the contract.
What pbsition would the successful bidder be in, bound under
somewhat severe penalties to enter into and complete his contract,
and yet with a rival and disappointed bidder having the sole legal
right to do the work ? Certainly, this shows that no contractor
could safely bid, and bind himself in the manner here required,
with sureties and stipulated damages for a failure, without in the
first place procuring the right from the owners. For, although
they might be willing to sell, that very willingness would make it
unsafe for him; because some other bidder might .step in and
secure the right, in anticipation of the opening of the bids. But
if any contractor should, before bidding, puichase the right, then
nobody except him could safely bid. It seems clear, therefore,
that proof merely of the willingness of the, owners to sell the
right at a fixed .price, does not preserve competition. And the
result in this instance, if not conclusive, is yet very satisfactory
proof of it. There was no bid except that of the owners of the
-patent.
It has been compared to the case of work ordered to be done
with a particular kind of stone, the quarry of which is owned by
one who is willing to sell to all alike'at a fixed price. Undoubtedly in that case there might be fre6 competition. If the owner
of the quarry, before the contract was let, should sell to. one
bidder enough stone for the *ork, he might the next day sell as
much to another bidder. And if neither of tliese should get it,
he might afterwards sell whatever-was needed to such person. as
did get the contract Such being the case, any bidder could
safely wait until -he obtained the contract before making arrangements for his stone. But there is a marked difference in the case
of the patent. There the owner having disposed of the right for
any particular district to one. person, cannot afterwards furnish
the same right to any other. This difference destroys the whole
force of the illustiation, and shows tha the safety of bidders
would be very different in the two cases.
It seems to me, therefore, a conclusion derivable from the ver'y
nature of the case, that competition could not be, and was not,
preserved in the letting of this contract; and that it was, there.
fore, beyond the scope and in violation of the spirit of the
charter.

